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Executive
Summary
The Lien Centre for Social Innovation is a think tank within 
Singapore Management University that examines the 
social landscape in Singapore and Southeast Asia. One 
of the centre’s major research programmes is the unmet 
social needs of vulnerable groups in Singapore. This paper 
focuses on a particularly large group in the Singapore social 
landscape: low/semi-skilled migrant workers. 
Low/semi-skilled migrant workers are a vital yet vulnerable 
part of Singapore: they are nearly one million in strength, 
or 27 per cent of the workforce, yet they also have a great 
many unmet challenges, including indebtedness, low 
wages, accommodation difficulties, and, in some cases, 
mistreatment and abuse. 
This study attempts to identify some of the welfare issues 
confronting one part of this community: South Asian 
migrant workers, working in low-waged manual jobs, 
mostly in the construction and shipyard industries. 
We surveyed 605 men in Little India in August 2013 
(see Figure 1). We measured the psychological 
distress (Kessler 6) of these men, and then correlated 
psychological distress with over 40 socio-economic 
variables. Of the 605, 344 had injury or salary claims 
lodged with the Ministry of Manpower (MOM), while 
261 were regular Work Permit holders. We followed up 
with 196 qualitative interviews with South Asian migrant 
workers, which allowed us to better understand the 
dynamics identified in the quantitative study.
The findings show that Serious Mental Illness (SMI) is, 
in all likelihood, endemic amongst our sample of injury 
and salary claim workers (mostly Special Pass holders1): 
62 per cent met the screening criteria for an SMI. 
In comparison, just 13 per cent of regular workers met 
the same criteria. 
What is the cause of this psychological distress? 
Amongst injury and salary claim workers, the major 
sources of psychological distress are, aside from 
workplace injuries, (i) a lack of accommodation 
(90 per cent of workers did not live with their employer), 
largely due to injured employees running away from their 
employers’ accommodation, and (ii) threats of repatriation 
from employers (64 per cent affected).
1 Approximately 80 per cent of injury and salary claim workers at the soup 
 kitchen are Special Pass holders. 
THIS PAPER FOCUSES 
ON A PARTICULARLY 
LARGE GROUP IN 
THE SINGAPORE 
SOCIAL LANDSCAPE: 
LOW/SEMI-SKILLED 
MIGRANT WORKERS. 
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Figure 1:
Primary Quantitative Dataset
REGULAR MIGRANT WORKERS:
Work Permit Holders
Recruited from 
the streets of Little India
INJURY AND SALARY CLAIM CASES:
Individuals with injury and salary claim 
cases registered with MOM 
Recruited from ‘The Cuff Road Project’ 
food programme in Little India
605 
SOUTH ASIAN 
MIGRANT WORKERS
The sample of regular Work Permit holders is, in general, 
emotionally healthy. There were, however, two classes 
of workers for whom this was not true: (i) workers who 
had paid agent fees (62 per cent affected), especially 
those with unpaid agent fee debt (six per cent affected), 
and (ii) workers whose employers have threatened them 
with repatriation (10 per cent affected). Workers in these 
categories showed significant distress. 
To address the problem of distress caused by lack of 
accommodation, we recommend exploring options for 
alternative housing for injury and salary claim workers. 
To address the problem of distress caused by threats of 
repatriation, we suggest exploring options for delinking 
Work Permit holders’ visas and employment contracts. 
To address the problem of distress brought on by agent fee 
debt, we recommend exploring the regulation of offshore 
migration agents.
344261
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Introduction
Background
There are approximately one million low-waged, low-skilled migrant workers in 
Singapore. They make up 27 per cent of Singapore’s workforce.2 These people 
are a vital part of Singapore’s economy and society: they staff the construction, 
marine (shipyard), manufacturing, and service industries, in addition to providing 
household labour as domestic workers. At the same time, they are a vulnerable 
population: they are generally workers from low socio-economic classes of 
developing countries, separated from their families, many saddled with debt, often 
working for long hours, and sometimes facing mistreatment and abuse. 
Given this dual nature of being both vital yet vulnerable, this study seeks to 
understand the welfare issues, particularly sources of psychological distress, 
faced by this large segment of the workforce.
The welfare issues highlighted in this report are important because mental health 
is a basic human right, in accordance with Article 12 of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.3 There are also important economic 
and political reasons why Singapore should be concerned about these issues. 
The mental health problems we identify are associated with undesirable industry 
practices, which may undermine Singapore’s reputation as a regional and global 
economic hub. While migrant workers are the most directly affected, there may be 
wider repercussions for the Singaporean society as well.
2 Total employment was 3.62 million as of December 2014. Non-resident employment comprised 
 991,300 Work Permit holders, 170,100 S Pass holders, and 178,900 Employment Pass (EP) holders.
“Foreign Workforce Numbers,” Ministry of Manpower, 12 March 2015, www.mom.gov.sg/statistics-publi
 cations/others/statistics/pages/foreignworkforcenumbers.aspx; 
“Employment,” Ministry of Manpower, 12 March 2015, http://stats.mom.gov.sg/Pages/Employment-
 Summary-Table.aspx;
 Kai Hong Phua, Rachel Hui, Marie Nodzenski and Nicole Bacolod, “Health of Migrants in Singapore. 
 Bringing the Migrant Health Discourse into Policy: The 2nd Research Exchange Workshop. Makati City, 
 The Philippines” (November 2012), www.asef.org/images/docs/Session%203_2_Kai%20Hong%20
 Phua_Preliminary%20results%20of%20studies%20of%20Singapore%20and%20Hon%20Kong%20
 SAR_1.pdf 
 
3 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, New York, 16 December 1966, United 
   Nations Treaty Series, vol. 993: 8
   https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20993/v993.pdf
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Most of the low-waged, low-skilled migrant workers 
in Singapore come from a small number of countries 
that are geographically close to Singapore, particularly 
the Philippines, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Bangladesh.4 In general, the migrant workers come to 
Singapore because of the lack of employment opportunities 
in their home countries and the lure of higher-paying jobs 
in Singapore. Most migrant workers pay agent fees 
(and sometimes training fees) of between $1,000 and 
$10,0005 to come to Singapore.6 Some are lucky enough 
to be able to borrow from family or close friends, but many 
have no choice but to resort to borrowing from pawn-
brokers and moneylenders who charge high interest rates.7
 
The working and living conditions of migrant workers in 
Singapore are largely governed by four main laws: (1) the 
Employment Act (EA) which governs terms and conditions 
of all employees in Singapore earning up to $4,500 per 
month [except Foreign Domestic Workers (FDWs]); (2) 
the Employment of Foreign Manpower Act (EFMA) which 
outlines the rights and responsibilities of both employers 
and migrant workers; (3) the Work Injury Compensation 
Act (WICA) which is a low-cost, no-fault compensation 
system8; and (4) the Employment Agencies Act (EAA) which 
regulates placement of workers by employment agencies.
When low-waged workers come to Singapore, they tend 
to be on the lowest of the three tiers of work visas in 
Singapore: the Work Permit (generally for workers earning 
less than $2,200/month). 
4 “Work Permit - Before You Apply,” Ministry of Manpower, 2014, www.
mom.gov.sg/foreign-manpower/passes-visas/work-permit-fw/before-you-
apply/Pages/overview.aspx
 
5 Note that all currencies are in Singapore Dollars. At the time 
of publishing, 1 Singapore Dollar = 0.72 US Dollars.
6 HOME and TWC2, “Justice Delayed, Justice Denied: The Experiences 
of Migrant Workers in Singapore” (2010), 10, http://twc2.org.sg/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/Justice-Delayed-Justice-Denied-ver2.pdf
 
7 In our qualitative interviews, workers reported paying three to six 
per cent interest rates per month.
8 FDWs are not covered by WICA, but employers are required to buy 
personal accident insurance for FDWs.
The other two classes of work visas are the S Pass 
(earning more than $2,200/month) and the Employment 
Pass (earning more than $3,300/month).9 Employers of 
non-Malaysian Work Permit holders are required to 
purchase a $5,000 security bond from the government, 
which is forfeited if either the employer or the Work Permit 
holder breaches a range of obligations, such as if the 
employer fails to pay for the upkeep and maintenance of the 
worker or fails to pay for the worker’s passage to their country 
of origin after their Work Permit expires.10 This security bond 
is part of a more general policy which ties Work Permit 
holders’ visas to a specific employer, meaning workers do not 
have the ability to change employers during the term of their 
contract without their employers’ prior approval.11 
Workers who are injured or have lodged salary claims are 
often shifted to a class of visa called a Special Pass. 
A Special Pass is class of visa that may be issued under 
a wide variety of circumstances.12 In this study, the Special 
Pass holders we are focusing on are those with outstanding 
injury or salary claims, and whose work permits have 
expired or been cancelled. On this visa, workers are 
entitled to remain in Singapore, but lose the right to work 
unless they receive special permission from MOM, and 
generally also the certification of a doctor for injured 
workers.13 
9   “Passes and Visas,” Ministry of Manpower, 2014, www.mom.gov.sg/ 
     foreign-manpower/passes-visas/Pages/default.aspx
10 “Work Permit (Foreign Worker) – Security Bond,” Ministry of Manpower, 
      2014, www.mom.gov.sg/foreign-manpower/passes-visas/work-permit-
      fw/before-you-apply/Pages/security-bond.aspx
11 “Work Permit - Before You Apply,” Ministry of Manpower, 2014, www.
     mom.gov.sg/foreign-manpower/passes-visas/work-permit-fw/before-you-
     apply/Pages/overview.aspx;
     “Work Permit (Foreign Worker) - Inform MOM,” Ministry of Manpower, 
      2014, www.mom.gov.sg/foreign-manpower/passes-visas/work-permit-
      fw inform-mom/Pages/update-of-details.aspx#changeemployer 
12 There are three main types of special passes:
1) Special Passes issued by MOM for work injury compensation cases 
after a Work Permit has been cancelled;
2) Special Passes issued by MOM to workers caught working illegally;
3) Special Passes issued by ICA for overstayers or other 
immigration offenses.
 
13 There exists a Temporary Job Scheme (TJS) to allow Special Pass holders 
to work. Our communication with the Ministry, workers, employers, and 
NGOs provided conflicting information on the TJS. MOM pointed to the 
existence of this scheme as providing a route towards work for Special Pass 
holders, so long as the workers are authorised as fit by a doctor. However, 
our interviews with workers failed to uncover more than a handful of 
Special Pass holders who were employed under the TJS. NGOs claimed 
that most injured workers were excluded because of their injuries – there 
being the danger of exacerbating their injury. Employers we interviewed 
claimed that the TJS didn’t work because workers who enrolled in the 
programme did not turn up for work. 
Singapore’s migrant worker employment system
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Previous research
While there are a number of high-quality research studies 
on non-domestic Work Permit holders14 in Singapore, 
undertaken by academic and non-government organisations 
(NGOs), the largest and most authoritative study of non-
domestic Work Permit holders is the Ministry of Manpower 
and Migrant Workers’ Centre Foreign Worker Survey 2014 
(FW Survey 2014).15 In this section, we will first review the 
FW Survey 2014, and then explain the three main ways our 
study aims to extend beyond the focus of the FW Survey 
2014.
The FW Survey 2014 surveyed 4,000 non-domestic 
migrant workers, which included 3,500 Work Permit 
holders and 500 S Pass holders.16 The exact methodology 
was not made public. The survey contained questions 
about 15 to 20 different areas of migrant workers’ lives. 
Questions included topics such as: their satisfaction with 
their job; their future intentions to work in Singapore; 
their reasons for staying in Singapore; why they think 
Singapore is a good/bad place to work; information on 
written contracts; working hours; salaries owed and 
payslips; employer withholding of travel documents; and 
awareness of channels for assistance in case of problems 
at work. The overall finding was that the vast majority of 
Work Permit holders (87.7 per cent) were satisfied with 
working in Singapore and planning to stay (84 per cent). 
In most areas investigated in detail – such as contracts, 
salary owed, payslips, and awareness of channels of 
assistance – the conditions of migrant workers were found 
to be essentially satisfactory. 
14 The term ‘non-domestic Work Permit holders’ excludes those migrant 
workers who work as live-in domestic workers (also known colloquially 
as ‘maids’).
 
15 MOM and MWC, “Ministry of Manpower and Migrant Worker Centre 
Foreign Worker Study 2011,” www.mom.gov.sg/Documents/statistics-
publications/MOM-and-MWC-FW-survey.pdf;
MOM and MWC, “Ministry of Manpower and Migrant Worker Centre 
Foreign Worker Survey 2014”, www.mom.gov.sg/Documents/statistics-
publications/Foreign%20Worker%20Survey%202014.pdf
 
16 Note that an S Pass (issued to higher-paid migrant workers) is different 
from a Special Pass (issued to injured workers and other persons who 
generally cannot work). Employment of Foreign Manpower (Work 
Passes) Regulations, Rg 2, rev. ed. (15 December 2009). 
While 85.7 per cent of Work Permit holders would 
recommend Singapore as a place for work, there are 
a number of areas highlighted by those who would not 
make this recommendation. 40 per cent complained of 
expensive employment agency fees; 32.6 per cent said 
they would not recommend Singapore as a place to work 
because of the low pay; and 13 per cent highlighted poor 
working conditions. A separate part of the study found 
that 62 per cent of all Work Permit holders said that their 
employers held their passports.17
 
How can our study make a meaningful contribution 
beyond the findings of this report? In short, there are three 
main ways that our study aims to extend beyond the focus 
of the FW Survey 2014. 
The first is by directly measuring the correlation 
between worker satisfaction/dissatisfaction (in our case, 
psychological distress) and an extensive array of social and 
economic conditions of the migrant worker. The results 
presented in the FW Survey 2014 are by and large what 
statisticians call univariate statistics – presenting one 
variable at a time – such as “per cent of satisfied workers” 
or “per cent with salary owed”. While this is informative, 
further analysis can be made by studying the relationship 
between worker satisfaction/dissatisfaction/distress and the 
various aspects of their working and living conditions. 
The second way our study aims to extend beyond the 
focus of the FW Survey 2014 is by conducting a detailed 
survey of Special Pass holders and other injury and salary 
claim workers. Of our total of 605 respondents, 344 were 
injury and salary claim workers, approximately 80 per cent 
of whom are Special Pass holders. As the FW Survey 2014 
was a study of Work Permit (and S Pass) holders, it did not 
study this group. 
17 In 2011, 97 per cent kept their Work Permits, and of those workers who 
didn’t keep either their Work Permit or passport, 27% said they did not 
get the documents back when they asked.
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Special Pass holders with injury and salary claims do make 
up a small fraction of the total migrant worker population: 
MOM highlighted that less than one per cent of Work 
Permit holders needed help with employment difficulties, 
with Special Pass holders being a subset of these.18 
Nevertheless, Special Pass holders do represent a section 
of the migrant worker population who (1) have come into 
serious conflict with their employer, and (2) are in need of 
protection and assistance from MOM. A close study of this 
group will be useful for shedding light on how Singapore’s 
migrant worker employment system is dealing with one of 
its most vulnerable populations.
18 “Ministerial Statement by Mr Tan Chuan-Jin, Acting Minister for 
Manpower, in response to Parliamentary Questions on Foreign Work
force Management,” Tan Chuan-Jin, 20 January 2014, www.mom.
gov.sg/newsroom/Pages/PQRepliesDetails.aspx?listid=160 
The third way our study aims to extend beyond the focus 
of the FW Survey 2014 is through the range and depth 
of economic and social variables or conditions faced by 
migrant workers, including: (1) workplace injuries, days 
of sick leave certified by a doctor, medical neglect, and 
time since injury; (2) workplace mistreatment including 
threats of repatriation, physical and verbal abuse; (3) the 
provider of accommodation (employer, self, lawyer, other); 
(4) responsibilities such as marriage and children; and (5) 
the size and state of repayment of agent fee debt. While 
we collected data on all of these variables, the vast majority 
did not have a statistically significant impact on emotional 
wellbeing. However, what is particularly interesting is 
that several of variables that did turn out to be significant 
– threat of repatriation; paying an agent fee; clearing of 
agent fee debt; ejection/running away from employer 
accommodation – were all variables that were to our 
knowledge absent in the FW Survey 2014.
SPECIAL PASS HOLDERS DO REPRESENT 
A SECTION OF THE MIGRANT WORKER 
POPULATION WHO (1) HAVE COME INTO 
SERIOUS CONFLICT WITH THEIR EMPLOYER, 
AND (2) ARE IN NEED OF PROTECTION AND 
ASSISTANCE FROM MOM.
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Methods and Data
Overview
Our quantitative study was conducted in August 2013 
in the Little India district of Singapore, a popular leisure 
space for many South Asian migrant workers. This 
involved a survey of 605 South Asian migrant workers.19 
There were three data collection locations: the first two 
locations were soup kitchens for the Transient Workers 
Count Too (TWC2) programme called The Cuff Road 
Project (TCRP). At these first two locations, we interviewed 
344 injury and salary claim workers. The third location was 
the streets of Little India, where 261 regular workers were 
interviewed. Data collection took two weeks to complete. 
The survey was designed in consultation with volunteers 
from TWC2, with the aim of better understanding the 
causes of psychological distress amongst their Special Pass 
clients at the meal centre, and amongst a comparative 
control group of regular Work Permit holders. The final 
survey was 39 questions long.
The survey was translated into both Bengali and Tamil 
by several persons who had both fluency in either of 
these languages and English, and who were familiar 
with the problems of injury and salary claim workers. 
The translation was checked by blind back-translations. 
Additional help with communication between interviewers 
and interviewees was provided in an ad hoc fashion by 
workers on hand.
19 Note that the survey was undertaken several months before the Little 
India riot of December 2013. 
The survey was conducted by approximately 50 volunteers, 
most of whom were students from the Singapore 
Management University (SMU). Volunteers were given an 
eight-page training manual, and also received half to one 
hour of face-to-face training by the study authors. Much of 
this training was done one-to-one.
Upon completion of the survey, migrant workers were 
entitled to two bars of soap.20
After data collection, input, and cleaning, a total of 1.2 per 
cent of values were missing (64 per cent of variables had 
at least one missing value, and 14.5 per cent cases had 
at least one missing value). Missing values were estimated 
using SPSS’s default multiple imputation routine.21 
The highest variables with missing values were ‘employer 
pays rent’ (3.6 per cent missing), and working hours 
(three per cent missing). Five data sets were imputed, and 
results presented in this paper are the pooled values for 
these data sets.
20 Note that the reason we chose two bars of soap as a gift for completing 
the survey was that, first, it was recommended as culturally appropriate 
by the volunteers at the meal programme where we were doing the 
survey, and, second, we felt that it met a useful halfway point between 
providing enough of an incentive to complete the survey, while not too 
much of motivation to encourage attempts at multiple responses 
(which we did have other checks for, such as the stamping of meal cards). 
21 IBM Corp. Released 2012. IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, 
Version 21.0. Armonk, NY: IBM Corp. 
Quantitative study of Work Permit holders and injury and salary claim workers
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Our qualitative study of injury and salary claim workers was 
conducted between March and August 2014. This involved 
interviews with 196 injury and salary claim workers. Our 
desire was to understand the dynamics behind (i) running 
away from employer accommodation, and (ii) threats of 
repatriation. Hence, we focused our interviews on workers 
who had one or both of these experiences. Interviews were 
conducted by eight trained interviewers, all but one of whom 
spoke either Tamil or Bengali. 
The demographic characteristics 
of our main sample
As mentioned, our quantitative survey was 
composed of 344 injury and salary claim 
workers who were registered with TCRP’s 
free meal programme,22 and 261 regular 
Work Permit holders from the streets of 
Little India (Figure 2). 
22 TCRP is a meal programme under the non-profit 
organisation TWC2 which serves migrant workers 
who are out of jobs due to injury, dispute with their 
employers or similar reasons. 
The majority of interviews were conducted in the native 
tongue of the interviewee. Interviewers received several 
hours of training, and worked with an interview schedule 
and set of questions, though they were free to deviate as 
they judged appropriate. Interviewees were given $10 
phonecards as compensation for the half hour to one hour 
interview. After the interviews, generally within the next day 
or week, the interviewers would take their hand-written notes 
and write a one-to-three-page account of the experiences 
of the interviewee.
Figure 2: 
Composition of quantitative sample
43% 
Regular 
Workers 
(n261)
57% 
Injury and 
salary claim workers
(n344)
Qualitative study of injury and salary claim workers
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Of the total sample, 34 per cent were 
Indian nationals, 65 per cent were 
Bangladeshi, and one per cent were 
of other nationalities (Figure 3). 
Figure 3:
Nationality
Figure 4:
Age
65% 
Bangladeshi 
(n396)
34% 
Indian
(n203)
1% 
Others
(n6)
Most of the migrant workers surveyed were between the ages of 20 and 40 (Figure 4), 
with the average age being 30 years and two months. 
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Age
Vital yet vulnerable
17
Of the migrant workers surveyed, 
63 per cent worked in the 
construction industry, 23 per cent 
worked in shipyards (e.g. building 
oil rigs and refitting ships), and 14 
per cent worked in other industries, 
which included landscaping, 
processing, service and agricultural 
sectors (Figure 5). 
Figure 5:
Employment by sector
Figure 6:
Injury and salary claim workers
Amongst the injury and salary claim 
workers that we surveyed, 93 per 
cent had injury-related problems 
and had lodged injury claims under 
WICA. 38 per cent had salary 
disputes lodged with MOM, and 31 
per cent of the sample had both 
(Figure 6).23
23 According to NGO volunteers, the reason 
for the high number of injury cases with 
salary claims (31 per cent of our sample) 
is that once a worker is injured and on a 
Special Pass, they then raise pre-existing 
grievances with regards to salary-claims. 
14% 
Other
Industries
(n87)
23% 
Shipyard
(n137)
7% 
Salary
Problem
(n33)
31% 
Both
(n107)
62% 
Injury
Problem
(n204)
63% 
Construction
(n381)
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When examining salary, we asked workers 
for their average monthly take-home pay, 
including overtime. For injured workers, 
we asked about their average monthly 
take-home pay before they were injured. 
The regular Work Permit holders we 
interviewed on the streets of Little India 
appeared to be employed in considerably 
better paying jobs than those in which 
the injury and salary claim workers had 
been. The average regular worker earned 
$1,299 per month, while the average 
injury or salary claim worker only earned 
$964 prior to their injury or salary dispute 
(Figure 7). 
Figure 7:
Salary
Figure 8:
Working hours
This lower pay – by approximately $300/
month – is despite the longer working 
hours amongst injury and salary claim 
workers vis-à-vis regular migrant workers. 
Prior to lodging injury and/or salary-related 
claims, injury and salary claim workers 
work an average of 69.6 hours. On the 
other hand, regular migrant workers only 
work an average of 60.4 hours (Figure 8).
It is not clear to us whether this difference 
in pay and hours of work is a reflection 
of biased retrospective thoughts on the 
part of emotionally distressed injured 
workers, or actually a real reflection of 
these workers coming from jobs with 
harsher working conditions. Both seem 
like possibilities. The injured workers were, 
on average, quite emotionally distressed, 
and it is known that such emotional states 
can alter recollections. On the other hand, 
a worker with worse working conditions 
might be more likely to be injured, leading 
to an over representation of such workers 
in the soup kitchens of Little India.
$1,299
$964
Regular 
Workers
Injury and Salary 
claim workers 
before dispute
60.4
hrs
69.6
hrs
Regular 
Workers
Injury and Salary 
claim workers 
before dispute
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We identified four main limitations in our study, 
namely: (i) the use of convenience sampling, 
the possibility of (ii) miscommunication, 
(iii) mistranslation, and (iv) retrospective bias.
First, our quantitative study consists of a convenience, 
non-random sample. We sampled injury and salary claim 
workers by approaching men at an NGO soup kitchen in 
Little India, while we sampled regular migrant workers by 
approaching men on the streets of Little India. Hence, there 
may be potential biases in the dataset, and the results need 
to be interpreted with that caveat. It is difficult to know if, for 
example, our sample of injury and salary claim workers is 
worse off than the average– since it is comprised mostly of 
workers who have run away from their employers; or if they 
are better off – since they have been able to find their way 
to support and assistance. Similarly, it is difficult to know 
if there are biases in our sample of regular Work Permit 
holders – who may be more privileged that the average 
worker because they are able to travel to Little India for 
shopping or recreation.
Second, the common language of the surveyors and the 
interviewees is English, which most of the interviewees 
Limitations
were not highly fluent in. This means there was the chance 
of miscommunication. We attempted to address this by 
translating the survey into Bengali and Tamil, and there were 
also students and other bilingual workers present to assist 
with language difficulties. 
Third, a small portion of the men interviewed were not fluent 
in reading their native language. These men were effectively 
illiterate, and required friends to translate the survey for 
them. This translation might have been imperfect, altering 
the interviewees’ understanding of the survey questions – 
which would in turn affect our analysis of the results. 
Fourth, the survey largely asks for retrospective information, 
particularly in the case of asking injury and salary claim 
workers about their employment experiences. The human 
memory is notoriously unreliable, and subject to biases 
where the past is reinterpreted, or even changed, in light of 
current circumstances. It is possible that, for example, injury 
and salary claim workers’ answers to the questions about 
employer abuse (which may have occurred 8 to 12 months 
ago) have been distorted by the present experiences of the 
hardship of unemployment while waiting for their injury and 
salary claims to be processed.
Measuring distress
Kessler 6 (K6)
For our study, we used a measure of psychological distress called the Kessler 6 (K6).24 The K6 scale, developed with 
the support of the US government, is part of the core of the US National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), and technical 
support for the use of the scale is hosted at Harvard University.25 
24 The K6 measure has been used as direct evidence of psychological distress (as opposed to a screening test which is followed by professional 
psychiatric assessment) in a wide range of studies, including:
J. E. Banta et al, “Binge Drinking Among California Adults: Results from the 2005 California Health Interview Survey.” The American Journal of Drug 
and Alcohol Abuse 34, no.6 (2005): 801-9, doi: 10.1080/00952990802491571; 
M. Fushimi et al, “Prevalence of Psychological Distress, as Measured by the Kessler 6 (K6), and Related Factors in Japanese Employees.” Community 
Mental Health Journal 48, no.3 (2012): 328-44, doi: 10.1007/s10597-011-9416-7; )
R. Giallo et al,). “Father Mental Health During the Early Parenting Period: Results of an Australian Population Based Longitudinal Study.” Social 
Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology 47, no.12 (2012):1907-16, doi: 10.1007/s00127-012-0510-0; 
M. F. Hilton et al, “The Prevalence of Psychological Distress in Employees and Associated Occupational Risk Factors.” Journal of Occupational and 
Environmental Medicine 50, no.7 (2008): 746-57, doi: 10.1097/JOM.ObO13e31817e9171; 
N. Krieger et al, “Racial Discrimination, Psychological Distress, and Self-Rated Health Among US-born and Foreign-Born Black Americans.” American 
Journal of Public Health 101, no.9 (2011): 1704-13, doi: 10.2105/AJPH.2011.300168; 
J. Layne Moore et al, “Serious Psychological Distress Among Persons with Epilepsy Based on the 2005 California Health Interview Survey.” Epilepsia 
50, no.5 (2009): 1077-84, doi: 10.1111/j.1528-1167.2008.01996.x; 
C. Li et al, “Undertreatment of Mental Health Problems in Adults with Diagnosed Diabetes and Serious Psychological Distress: the Behavioral Risk 
Factor Surveillance System.” Diabetes Care 33, no.5 (2010): 1061-64, doi: 10.2337/dc09-1515; 
G. Zhao et al, “Serious Psychological Distress and its Associations with Body Mass Index: Findings from the 2007 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance 
System.” International Journal of Public Health 54, no.1 (2009): 30-36, doi: 10.1007/s00038-009-0004-3.
 
25 “K10 and K6 Scales,” National Comorbidity Survey, n.d., www.hcp.med.harvard.edu/ncs/k6_scales.php 
Social Insight Research Series
20
Figure 9:
The K6 questions
1. During the past 30 days, about how often did you feel nervous? 
2. During the past 30 days, about how often did you feel hopeless? 
3. During the past 30 days, about how often did you feel restless or fidgety? 
4. During the past 30 days, about how often did you feel so depressed 
that nothing could cheer you up?
5. During the past 30 days, about how often did you feel that 
everything was an effort? 
6. During the past 30 days, about how often did you feel worthless? 
For each question, the respondent is asked to answer on a 5-point scale:
0. None of the time
1. A little of the time
2. Some of the time
3. Most of the time
4. All of the time
The sum of the six answers to these questions gives a number between 0 (no psychological 
distress) and 24 (high psychological distress).
It has been translated into over 11 languages including: 
Arabic, Cantonese, Mandarin, Dutch, French, Hebrew, 
Italian, Japanese, Nepali, Sinhalese, and Spanish.
The K6 is designed as a brief (2-3 minutes) yet sensitive 
screening scale for non-specific psychological distress in 
adults. Respondents are required to answer six items rated 
on a 5-point scale, ranging from “none of the time” 
(value = 0) to “all of the time” (value = 4). The six questions, 
along with their Bengali translation, are listed in Figure 9. 
The scale gives a score from 0 to 24. 
Translation of table above:
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Serious Mental Illness
An extension of the K6 scale is the concept of a Serious 
Mental Illness (SMI). A person with an SMI is defined by 
Kessler, et al. (2010) as:
A person who has met one of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual-IV disorder criteria (excluding developmental 
and substance abuse), AND has also met ONE of the 
following criteria: 
• made a serious lethal suicide attempt; 
• a work disability; 
• a bipolar I disorder; 
• serious violence or criminality; 
• been out of role for over 30 days in a year.26 
In lay person’s terms, a person with SMI has met two 
criteria: First, they have been diagnosed with a mood, 
anxiety, eating, impulse, sleeping, adjustment or psychotic 
disorder, which has reached a level that functionally 
impairs them or limits one or more major life activities. 
Second, they have met one of the five other criteria listed 
by Kessler above.
The K6 scale has been calibrated against the SMI 
diagnostic criteria, and thus can be used as a screening 
tool for SMI. Specifically, someone is likely to have SMI if 
their K6 score is 13 or above.27
In the US, a 2007 study using K6 found that, in the 30 days 
prior to the survey, 3.1 per cent of adults met the criteria 
for having an SMI, with this rising to eight per cent of adults 
living below the poverty line.28 A 2012 study found that 
4.1% of US adults met the criteria for having an SMI.29
26 Kessler et al, “Screening for serious mental illness,” 4-22.
27 Ibid; Fushimi et al, “Prevalence of psychological distress,” 328-44.
28 Laura. A. Pratt, and Achintya. N. Dey,“Characteristics of Adults with 
Serious Psychological Distress as Measured by the K6 Scale: United 
States, 2001-04”(US Department of Health and Human Services, 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health 
Statistics, March 30, 2007), no.382, www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad382.pdf
29 “Serious Mental Illness (SMI) among Adults,” National Institute of 
 Mental Health, n.d., www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/prevalence/
serious-mental-illness-smi-among-us-adults.shtml
Examples 
The following examples show how the K6 has been 
utilised to screen for psychological distress under various 
circumstances. A recent quantitative study of 93,606 
American adults found that amongst healthy people, the 
effect of divorce (controlling for all other factors) on healthy 
persons was a rise in their K6 scores by 0.46 points 
(on a 0-24 K6 scale). Amongst 55,154 with a chronic 
health condition (such as hypertension, asthma, diabetes, 
liver or kidney disease), the controlled effect of being in 
chronic pain was a rise in their K6 scores by 1.88 points.30
Qualitatively, the three following examples show how the 
K6 scores of 7, 14, and 19 manifest in South Asian migrant 
workers (injury and salary claim workers). 
30 N. C. Kaiser, N. Hartoonian, and J. E. Owen, “Toward a Cancer-
Specific Model of Psychological Distress: Population Data from
the 2003–2005 National Health Interview Surveys.” Journal of Cancer 
Survivorship 4, no.4 (2010): 291-302, doi: 10.1007/s11764-010-
0120-3.
A RECENT 
QUANTITATIVE STUDY 
OF 93,606 AMERICAN 
ADULTS FOUND THAT 
AMONGST HEALTHY 
PEOPLE, THE 
EFFECT OF DIVORCE 
(CONTROLLING FOR 
ALL OTHER FACTORS) 
ON HEALTHY 
PERSONS WAS A RISE 
IN THEIR K6 SCORES 
BY 0.46 POINTS (ON A 
0-24 K6 SCALE). 
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Figure 10:
An example of a worker
with a K6 score of 7
Nervous: Some of the time (2) 
Hopeless: Some of the time (2) 
Fidgety: Some of the time (2) 
Depressed: None of the time (0) 
Everything is an effort: A little of the time (1) 
Worthless: None of the time (0)
Summary: Even though Polash went into $4,200 of debt, had a bad accident, and 
had been badly treated by his employer, his experiences with Singapore’s NGOs and 
MOM were positive. MOM forced Polash’s employer to return $4,000 to him, which 
paid his debts. He can now go home happy, healthy, and debt free. When asked 
whether he trusts Singapore law, he said he has “complete faith in the MOM.”
Polash is from a very poor family, and he needed to support his wife and children. He borrowed $4,200 
from friends and family back home to come to Singapore to work as a construction worker in 2011. 
When he first came to Singapore, he was relatively happy and content with his life. Work was hard, 
but he would tell himself that it was a test from God and he would have to accept this life as a 
reality. His loneliness would make him feel low, but at the end of the day, he would feel happy that 
he was at least employed here and was being paid in Singapore dollars – something he could only 
dream of back home. 
However, his life changed when he fell from a height at a construction site in February 2013. In 
totality, he was advised to take four months of rest. His employer housed him, but refused to pay 
his medical bills, and after the four months, the Safety Coordinator began to threaten him that 
they would send him back to Bangladesh soon.
Due to fear from these unreasonable threats, he left the workers’ home and moved in with some 
of his friends in Little India. They advised him about the voluntary organisation TWC2, and about 
lodging a claim directly with MOM. 
It’s been almost a year now, and the interviewee feels relatively happier. When he arrived from 
Bangladesh, his contract said that he would be paid $65 for a basic work day (8am to 5pm) and 
$27/day for overtime work. However, he was only paid $14 a day. Despite this, he continued 
working because he had to clear the loan and interest he had taken back home before coming to 
Singapore. However, MOM has now forced the company to pay him the $4,000 it owes. He has 
now cleared a major part of the loan. When asked whether he trusts Singapore law, he said that he 
has “complete faith in the MOM”.
At present, he is awaiting the last set of medical tests and an approval from MOM within 20-25 
days before he can leave Singapore for good. He is happy because he can get to see his family 
after three long years.
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Figure 11:
An example of a worker
with a K6 score of 14
Nervous: Most of the time (3) 
Hopeless: Most of the time (3) 
Fidgety: Some of the time (2) 
Depressed: Some of the time (2)  
Everything is an effort: Some of the time (2) 
Worthless: Some of the time (2)
Summary: Palani went $10,000 into debt to move to Singapore. He suffered a 
substantial injury to his head due to dangerously fast work conditions. His employer 
threatened him for not returning to work, and he eventually ran away fearing his 
employer would use “gangsters”31 to repatriate him. A year after the accident, he is 
still in considerable pain and his injury claim with MOM is not resolved, though MOM 
has forced his employer to pay his medical bills. Palani cannot wait to return home. 
He said that he wants to deconstruct the glamorous image of Singapore that draws 
workers to this country every year.
Palani sold his business in India for $10,000 to move to Singapore and get a construction job. He 
supports his wife, mother, and son. He used to be paid about $900 per month, and would send 
back about $400 to $500 per month to his family.
 
About a year ago, Palani had an accident at work where a large metal block struck his head. He 
said this happened because his supervisor was making the workers complete dangerous work at a 
fast pace. His employer took him to hospital and he was treated, but then his supervisor threatened 
to deduct $50 per day in pay if he didn’t return to work. He went back to work despite being in 
pain. However, eventually it was too much and he left his job a month later.
 
Palani then registered his injury claim with MOM. He voluntarily left his employer’s housing, fearing 
that if he stayed there, his supervisor would threaten him even more. In fact, he had heard that his 
supervisor was planning to use gangsters to get him to return home, should he take action.
He now lives with his friends in their house. Although his medical condition (pain in his eye and 
head) hasn’t improved considerably, he is happier and tension-free. The company has to cover his 
medical bills (because of MOM intervention), and he doesn’t fear his supervisor any longer.
Throughout this time, he kept his emotional pain to himself, and would not talk about it to others. 
His family knows of his injury; however, they are unaware of all the legal proceedings. Palani cannot 
wait to return home. He said that he wants to deconstruct the glamorous image of Singapore that 
draws Indian workers to this country every year.
31 This is the term workers commonly use for the employees of repatriation agencies.
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Figure 12:
An example of a worker
with a K6 score of 19
Nervous: All of the time (4) 
Hopeless: Most of the time (3) 
Fidgety: All of the time (4) 
Depressed: Some of the time (2) 
Everything is an effort: All of the time (4) 
Worthless: Some of the time (2)
Summary: Hossain borrowed $8,000 to come to Singapore and was injured eight 
months later. His injury was not severe but his company refused to allow him to work, 
leaving him unemployed with a very large debt. He lodged an injury claim with MOM 
and has been effectively unemployed for about eight months. Hossain feels an immense 
sense of burden from his family, and a deep sense of injustice at the way he has been 
treated by his employer. The interviewer felt he was suicidal.
Hossain came to Singapore in late 2012, and was injured in mid-2013 when he fell from a 
significant height. He paid $8,000 in agent fees, and is still paying them back with the help of 
his brothers currently.
He was taken to the doctor and was given one day sick leave. The company gave him a letter of 
guarantee (LOG)32 for the first few visits, but refused to give any for the Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
(MRI), and subsequent visits.
 
When he got better, the company refused to allow him to work again because they thought he was too 
much of a risk, so he was made unemployed. He lodged an injury claim with MOM and now lives with 
his brother (who pays for his accommodation). Due to lack of money he calls home once in 10 days.
He feels depressed most of the time as he feels that he has let his family down. His burden comes 
mainly from not being able to support them. “There is dignity in being a worker as I know I have 
an income and can support my family”. Whenever he calls home, he feels all the more burdened 
as his family members keep complaining about their situation and how much he is worsening their 
condition. He says, “Now nothing matters anymore.”
 
He hates his former company. He says that his boss used to constantly threaten him that he will 
be sent home and all employees lived in constant fear of repatriation. He was also hit a few times. 
MOM told him the company didn’t have any right to repatriate him, after which such threats stopped, 
increasing his faith in MOM.
 
He also says that his company owes him $400, as they were deducting $50 per month from his salary 
to pay for his flight back home. They have yet to pay him this money back. 
These days he prefers to isolate himself and sit alone. He has limited appetite and sleep. [At this 
point the interviewer writes in her interview notes: “I feel he’s on the brink of suicide”].
32 A letter of guarantee (LOG) is a letter from the employer to the doctor or hospital guaranteeing to pay the worker’s medical bills.
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Our survey found three main drivers of psychological distress amongst South Asian migrant workers: (1) accommodation 
problems of injury and salary claim workers, (2) the threat of repatriation by employers, and (3) agent fee debt.
Findings
Figure 13:
Time since injury
The accommodation problems 
of injury and salary claim workers
Before we deal with the specific problem of 
accommodation, we want to present an overview 
of the general conditions of the injury and 
salary claim workers we surveyed.
 
Overview
Time without certified sick leave: Amongst the 
injured workers, the average injury occurred 256 days 
(approximately 8.5 months) ago. The distribution of 
days since injury (amongst injured workers) is shown in 
Figure 13. The distribution of days of sick leave certified 
by a doctor is shown in Figure 14. The average certified 
sick leave time was 93 days (three months and three 
days). The information from these two graphs can be 
integrated, giving Figure 15: the number of days with 
injury but no certified sick leave. On average, injured 
workers had spent 163 days (approximately 5.5 months) 
without certified sick leave.
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Figure 14:
Sick leave certified by doctor
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Figure 15:
Days with injury 
but no certified sick leave
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To make sense of these statistics, it is necessary 
to provide some background on the work injury 
compensation system (WICA) in Singapore. WICA 
provides employees with a low-cost alternative to 
common law settlement of compensation claims. Every 
employer is required by law to maintain adequate Work 
Injury Compensation insurance for all manual workers, 
and all non-manual workers earning less than $1,600 
a month.33 For the employee, the advantage of WICA is 
that there is no need to prove fault of the employer and 
the claim can be made without a lawyer. Compensation 
under WICA is fixed and capped, based on a formula. 
Compensation covers certified sick leave wages (up to 
a year), medical expenses (up to $30,000 or 1 year, 
whichever is reached first), and compensation for 
‘per cent permanent incapacitation’ or death (up to 
$218,000). Alternatively, a worker may lodge a civil suit, 
where compensation is not capped, but if they choose 
this route they must prove fault, substantiate damage 
claims, and, generally, employ a lawyer. A worker must 
elect whether to file a WICA claim with MOM or a civil 
suit. They cannot do both.34
33 “Work Injury Compensation Insurance,” Ministry of Manpower, 
7 May 2015, www.mom.gov.sg/workplace-safety-and-health/
work-injury-compensation/work-injury-compensation-insurance
34 “Work Injury Compensation Act,” Ministry of Manpower, 15 November 
2012, www.mom.gov.sg/legislation/occupational-safety-health/Pages/
work-injury-compensation-act.aspx;
“Work Injury Compensation: A Guide For Employees,” Ministry of 
Manpower and WSH Council, October 2013,
www.mom.gov.sg/Documents/safety-health/WIC%20Guide%20for%20
Employees%20(English).pdf
There are multiple ways to read the statistics in Figures 
13, 14, and 15. Some have claimed that the long 
periods of time taken to resolve injury claims show 
that the WICA system is not working in the interests of 
workers. However, there are some legitimate reasons why 
WICA cases may take a long time to resolve: the first is 
that serious injuries often need time to stabilise before 
a final ‘per cent incapacitation’ can be calculated; and 
second, there is the right of both parties to appeal a 
decision, legitimately drawing out cases. On top of these 
legitimate reasons for WICA delays, there are also claims 
by employers that workers and their lawyers deliberately 
draw out the WICA process so as to allow workers more 
time to ‘moonlight’ – i.e. work illegally in Singapore. 
WICA PROVIDES EMPLOYEES WITH A LOW-COST 
ALTERNATIVE TO COMMON LAW SETTLEMENT OF 
COMPENSATION CLAIMS.
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Figure 16:
Neglect of medical treatment
36%
10%
40%
1. Missed 
Treatment
(no Letter 
of Guarantee)
2. Did not 
receive 
necessary 
operation
1+2 
(excluding 
overlap)
Neglect of medical care: 40 per cent of 
injured workers reported either (1) missing 
treatments because they did not have a 
LOG – a letter from their employer to the 
hospital guaranteeing to pay the medical 
bills – and/or (2) not receiving necessary 
operations (Figure 16).
Employer abuse: 47 per cent of injury 
and salary claim workers reported 
being verbally abused (Figure 17). This 
compared to just 13 per cent of regular 
workers. Seven per cent of injury and 
salary claim workers reported being 
physically abused.35 This compared to just 
two per cent of regular workers.
35 The exact questions asked were “Has your boss 
scolded you?” and “Has your boss hit you?”
Figure 17:
Verbal & physical abuse
Injury and
Salary claim
Regular
47% Verbal abuse
13% Verbal abuse
7% Physical abuse
2% Physical abuse
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K6 distribution: The distribution of K6 scores of 
injury and salary claim workers, and regular 
Work Permit holders are vastly different. The 
mean K6 score of an injury and salary claim 
worker is 13.7, while the mean K6 score of 
regular workers is 6.5.36 See Figures 18 and 19.
36 An independent samples t-test found that the 
mean difference in K6 scores of 7.18 was significant 
with p < 0.001.
Figure 18:
Distribution of K6 scores
(injury and salary claim workers)
Figure 19:
Distribution of K6 scores
(regular workers)
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Figure 20:
Serious Mental Illness
Figure 21:
Housing rental
SMI: The K6 distribution of injury and salary 
claim workers translates to a remarkably 
high predicted prevalence of SMI: 62 per 
cent. This compares to 13 per cent of regular 
workers. See Figure 20. 
4.1%
13%
62%
US 
population
(2012)
Regular Injury and 
salary claim
The accommodation problem: One of the 
most notable findings of our survey was 
that only 10 per cent of injury and salary 
claim workers lived in employer provided 
accommodation. This compared to 78 per 
cent of regular workers. See Figure 21.
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When we divide the injury and salary claim 
workers into two groups – those who live in 
employer provided accommodation and those 
who do not – we see a significant difference 
in the K6 scores (Figure 22) and predicted 
prevalence of an SMI (Figure 23): those who 
lived in employer provided accommodation 
have an average K6 of 10.02 with 34 per cent 
predicted to have an SMI, while those who do 
not live in employer provided accommodation 
have an average K6 of 14.11 with 65 per 
cent predicted to have an SMI. Also notice 
demonstrated in Figure 22 is the scale of the 
raw numbers of workers not living in employer 
provided accommodation: 310 workers from a 
total sample of 344.
Our survey demonstrated (1) a large number 
of injury and salary claim workers not living 
in employer provided accommodation, and 
(2) a correlation between not living in 
employer provided accommodation and 
psychological distress. 
Employers and migrant workers provide 
competing accounts of why injury and salary 
claim workers are not living in employer 
provided accommodation.In our interviews with 
employers for a related study (forthcoming), 
employers claimed that injured workers 
would run away from employer-provided 
accommodation, either to find more convenient 
or better amenities, such as wanting to live 
closer to the city, or, because of a desire 
to ‘moonlight’ – i.e. work illegally. Some 
employers claimed that workers delay their 
repatriation using the WICA procedures, and 
in doing so, get to be placed on the Special 
Pass and earn up to 18 months extra time in 
Singapore to ‘moonlight’.
Figure 22:
Mean K6 scores of injury and salary
claim workers
Figure 23:
Proportion of injury and salary claim
workers predicted to have an SMI
14.11
10.02
Not living 
with employer
(n310)
Living with 
employer
(n34)
65%
34%
Not living 
with employer
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Living with 
employer
(n34)
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Our qualitative surveys generally found workers 
expressing a different account of the situation. 
The workers claimed that they ran away from employer-
provided accommodation because of either a fear for 
their physical safety or a general discomfort with living 
in accommodation provided by an employer whom they 
are claiming against. See, for example, the case studies 
in Figures 11, 30, and 31.
Our quantitative survey provides some data to support 
the migrant workers’ perspective on this issue. Our survey 
found a probable motivation for workers running away: 65 
per cent of injury and salary claim workers report that they 
had been threatened with repatriation by their employer, 
which will be elaborated in the next section of this report. 
This said, employer’s claims about ‘moonlighting’ may still 
stand true, and further research is necessary to ascertain 
the exact dynamics of ‘runaway’ workers. 
Legal and policy implications
Under the EFMA, employers are required to ensure 
acceptable accommodation for their foreign employees 
until repatriation. Employers who fail to do so may be 
fined up to $10,000, or subject to a financial penalty of 
up to the same amount. They may also be imprisoned 
up to 12 months. Failure to meet the regulatory 
requirements will also be taken into consideration for all 
future work passes applications or renewals submitted by 
the employer.37 
 
According to a forum reply from MOM published in the 
Straits Times on 13 Dec 2014, there are measures in 
place to support injured workers on Special Pass: 
“Employers are required to provide adequate food, 
acceptable housing, and pay any medical leave 
wages and medical bills during the entire work 
injury compensation claim process, even after the 
workers’ Work Permits have already been cancelled. 
The MOM regularly conducts checks with Special 
Pass holders, and will take action against 
employers who fail to fulfil their responsibilities. A 
recent MOM survey of more than 500 Special Pass 
holders found that the large majority either had 
no issues with food and housing, or had declined 
MOM’s offer to ensure their employers provide for 
their upkeep. Special Pass holders who are not 
receiving adequate upkeep and maintenance from 
their employers or former employers can lodge a 
complaint with MOM.”38 
 
37 “Housing requirements for foreign worker,” Ministry of Manpower,
22 December 2014, from http://beta.mom.gov.sg/passes-and-
permits/work-permit-for-foreign-worker/sector-specific-rules/housing-
requirements 
38 “Support given for injured foreign workers,” Ministry of Manpower, 
13 December 2014, www.mom.gov.sg/newsroom/Pages/
PressRepliesDetail.aspx?listid=266 
In light of our studies findings – that only 10 per cent 
of injury and salary claim workers live in employer 
provided accommodation, and those who do not show 
significantly more emotional distress – we suggest 
that the existing provisions for Special Pass holder 
accommodation are inadequate.
 
One route for further policy development on this issue 
is to look into options for alternative accommodation for 
injury and salary claim workers. Could MOM mandate 
employers to monetise the accommodation and other 
benefits owed to injury and salary claim workers, allowing 
workers to find their own accommodation? Or could 
MOM, directly or indirectly through a third party, provide 
injury and salary claim workers with accommodation, and 
bill employers for the cost?
UNDER THE EFMA, 
EMPLOYERS ARE 
REQUIRED TO 
ENSURE ACCEPTABLE 
ACCOMMODATION 
FOR THEIR FOREIGN 
EMPLOYEES UNTIL 
REPATRIATION. 
EMPLOYERS WHO 
FAIL TO DO SO MAY BE 
FINED UP TO $10,000, 
OR SUBJECT TO A 
FINANCIAL PENALTY 
OF UP TO THE 
SAME AMOUNT.
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Threats of repatriation
Overview
We asked workers: “Has your boss threatened to send you home?” (see Figure 24). Amongst the regular Work Permit 
holders, 10 per cent answered “Yes”. In contrast, amongst our injury and salary claim workers, 64 per cent answered 
“Yes”. See Figure 25.
Figure 24:
The threat of repatriation
question (and Bengali translation)
Figure 25:
Proportion of migrant workers
threatened with repatriation
64%
10%
Regular Injury and 
Salary claim
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The effect of such threats on psychological distress is 
quite significant, as detailed in Figures 26, 27, 28, and 
29. With regular workers, the difference is marked, with 
the threatened and not threatened workers differing by 
nearly six points on the K6 scale (Figure 26).39 48 per 
cent of regular workers threatened with repatriation were 
predicted to have an SMI (versus just nine per cent of 
those not threatened) (Figure 27). 
39 An independent samples t-test found that the mean difference in K6 
scores of 5.84 was significant with p < 0.001. 
For the injury and salary claim workers, the difference 
is smaller but still substantial, at just over two points 
(Figure 28).40 70 per cent of injury and salary claim 
workers threatened with repatriation were predicted to 
have an SMI (versus 46 per cent of those not threatened) 
(Figure 29). 
40 An independent samples t-test found that the mean difference in K6 
scores of 2.76 was significant with p < 0.001.
40 An independent samples t-test found that the mean 
difference in K6 scores of 2.76 was significant with 
p < 0.001.
39 An independent samples t-test found that the mean 
difference in K6 scores of 5.84 was significant with 
p < 0.001.
Figure 26:
Mean K6 scores of workers 
threatened with repatriation
Figure 27:
Proportion of threatened 
regular workers predicted
to have an SMI
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Figure 28:
Mean K6 scores of injury and salary claim
workers (threatened with repatriation)
Figure 29:
Proportion of injury and salary claim
workers (threatened with repatriation)
predicted to have an SMI
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Legal and policy implications
There are existing regulations which should protect 
workers from arbitrary termination of their employment. 
Under the Singapore system for terminating employment 
contracts, a Work Permit holder’s employment contract 
is subject to the same notice requirements as local 
workers’ contracts (in situations where there are no other 
agreements). Written notice must be provided in advance 
of termination. 
This notice period depends on the length of service: 
one day notice for service less than six months, 
one week notice for service between six months and two 
years, and two to four weeks’ notice for longer periods 
of service.41 
41 “Contract of Service: Termination of Contract with Notice,” Ministry 
of Manpower, (2014), www.mom.gov.sg/employment-practices/
employment-rights-conditions/contract-of-service-termination/pages/
contracts-of-service-and-termination.aspx; 
Ministry of Manpower, A Guide for Foreign Employee: My employer told 
me not to come for work. What should I do?”, 10 January 2014, 
http://mom.gov.sg/documents/statistics-publications/brochures/foreign-
employee-service-terminated-english.pdf
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A Work Permit must be cancelled within a week 
of employment ending. Processing by MOM takes, 
at most, three working days, though generally less 
than a day.42 Upon cancellation of Work Permits, 
employers need to ensure that non-Malaysian workers 
are repatriated within a week.43 Workers with outstanding 
employment issues, such as injury and salary claims, 
are eligible for a Special Pass. A Special Pass allows 
the worker to remain in Singapore legally while waiting 
for their outstanding claims and/or other issues to be 
resolved. Further, MOM has an arrangement with the 
Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (ICA) where 
any worker with employment grievances at immigration 
checkpoints will be referred to MOM for investigation.44
 
In theory, these regulations should limit the influence 
of employer’s threats of repatriation. However, there 
are several possible reasons why these regulations are 
not translating into changes in employer behaviour or 
employee beliefs.
 
First, workers are often on the losing end of the bargain 
with their employers. Upon termination of their Work 
Permit, these men will have to return to their home 
which they had left due to the lack of employment 
opportunities, amongst other reasons in the first place. 
They do not have the luxury of time and mobility to look 
for alternative employment opportunities in Singapore. 
42 Ministry of Manpower, n.d., “…check the outcome (approved 
or rejected) on the same day if submission is made before 8pm 
(Mon-Fri) and 2pm (Sat). Otherwise, please check on the next working 
day,” “Step-by-Step Guide to Cancel A Foreign Worker…” www.mom.
gov.sg/Documents/services-forms/passes/step-by-step-guide/Step_by_
Step_Guide_for_eCancellation_of_FW_WP.pdf
43 “Cancel a Work Permit,” Ministry of Manpower, 28 January 2015, 
http://beta.mom.gov.sg/passes-and-permits/work-permit-for-foreign-
worker/cancel-a-work-permit 
44 “…MOM has an arrangement with the Immigration and Checkpoints 
Authority (ICA) to surface complaints and refer departing foreign 
employees who express employment grievances at the immigration 
checkpoints. These employees will then be referred to MOM for 
investigations.” Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (21 
November 2011) (Mr Tharman Shanmugaratnam), 88: 638, http://
sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/report.jsp?currentPubID=00076180-WA 
On the other hand, employers can easily employ other 
migrant workers in replacement. This puts considerable 
power in the hands of the employer to issue threats. 
Second, from our qualitative interviews with migrant 
workers, it seems clear that there is a pervasive belief 
amongst these workers that their employers can 
repatriate them should they choose to do so, meaning 
that threats from employers are often taken at face value.
 
Third, workers often have limited access to, and 
consequently, limited confidence in governmental 
channels of assistance. In our interviews, we found 
workers often have difficulty providing the authorities 
with hard evidence that they have been mistreated, 
and therefore warrant assistance. The nature of 
interpersonal relations and acts of abuse, such as 
the threat of repatriation, is that they leave very little 
documentary evidence. Figure 30 shows one example 
of the story of a Special Pass holder who had exactly 
this problem proving to MOM that he was being abused. 
MOM was vigilant in acting once it had ‘documentary’ 
evidence, but clearly this was too late. In this regard, 
the difficulty of providing documentary evidence may 
(i) weaken a worker’s claim should he approach MOM 
or other relevant authorities for assistance; (ii) delay 
the necessary assistance to migrant workers; and 
consequently (iii) prevent some workers from seeking 
assistance in the first place as they have little confidence 
of receiving the desired assistance and protection. 
WORKERS 
OFTEN HAVE LIMITED 
ACCESS TO, 
AND CONSEQUENTLY, 
LIMITED CONFIDENCE 
IN GOVERNMENTAL 
CHANNELS OF 
ASSISTANCE.
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Figure 30:
Why waiting for ‘documentation’
of abuse may be too late
Jabed fell from the second level of the building, injuring his lower back, left leg and arm. For two 
or three days, the company refused to take him to a doctor. Eventually, Jabed went on his own, but 
the company found him and forced him to come back. Three days later, the company locked him 
in a room for four days. Jabed thinks he was confined by the company so that he would not run to 
the doctors or MOM, and that in the meantime, they could arrange for his flight back home. Jabed 
managed to escape, and after staying with friends, found a place to rent for $200 per month.
 
He went to a large public hospital to have his injuries treated, but the doctors said he required a 
LOG from the employer for an MRI scan. He then went to MOM, which arranged a meeting with the 
company and insurance company for the next day. MOM then confirmed the salary due to Jabed. 
MOM told Jabed to live with his employer, which Jabed refused to do as he was scared that he would 
be forced to go back and may be tortured. A few days later, Jabed was threatened with repatriation 
again by his employer, and this time Jabed got hold of documentary proof of purchase of the plane 
ticket, and went straight to MOM. MOM then spoke to the company, forcing them to cancel the ticket. 
This incident hurried the process of acquiring a Special Pass for him.
 
The prevalence of treats of repatriation is likely to have 
three main implications. First, according to interviews 
with injured migrant workers, the practice of threatening 
repatriation is intimately related to the problem of 
injured workers ‘running away’ from the accommodation 
provided by their employer, and the subsequent problem 
of a large pool of injured migrant workers reliant on 
NGOs for their support. An example of this is illustrated 
in Figure 31. Second, if employers are using threats 
to prevent workers from accessing basic services like 
medical help or the workers’ compensation system, then 
this behaviour contradicts the law. Third, and relatedly, 
if employers can use threats of repatriation to hide 
workplace injuries and disputes, then it necessarily 
means that these threats are undermining occupational 
health and safety, and labour dispute statistics. An 
example of this is illustrated in Figure 32.
Social Insight Research Series
38
Figure 31:
Example of the dynamics
of injuries, threats of repatriation,
and loss of accommodation
Figure 32:
Example of compromised
health and safety because
of threats of repatriation
Imran injured his fingers while unloading a truck. He was taken to a nearby private clinic, bandaged, 
and given two weeks of Medical Certificate leave (MC). His boss told him not to report the incident 
to anyone and if asked by his colleagues, to tell them that he was wearing his personal protective 
equipment. The boss told Imran that if he spoke about the incident to anyone, they would 
immediately send him back to Bangladesh.
 
Several weeks later, Imran realised he did not receive any payment from the company for the 
time he was on MC. A rumour spread around the company that Imran had a meeting with a lawyer 
about this. The boss then summoned Imran to the office and began questioning him about the 
lawyer. The boss was aggressive, even threatening to have him beaten up by hit-men. The boss 
told Imran to be very careful.
 
That night Imran was advised by friends to leave the company premises, and now lives in a rented 
room in Little India.
Subir slipped a disc in his back while assisting a crane with a lift. He is now pursuing his 
compensation claim through MOM. He feels that his employer uses the threat of repatriation 
to intimidate witnesses. The Safety Supervisor from his ex-company has refused to serve as an 
eyewitness in his favour. Subir believes that the ‘biggest problem faced by construction workers in 
Singapore’ is that even though other workers see the injury, nobody dares to stand witness for fear 
of being fired. Another witness, a friend of his who used to work with him at his ex-company, but 
now works in another company, has agreed to testify for him.
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There are two potential routes for further policy 
development on this issue: (i) changing employer 
discretion over repatriation conditions, and (ii) ensuring 
protection in the absence of documentary proof of 
threats of repatriation, and/or other abuse.
The first is to look into options to change employers’ 
discretion over, and involvement in, Work Permit holders’ 
visa and repatriation conditions. Employer discretion over 
repatriation could be reduced by delinking a Work Permit 
holder’s visa and employment contract. This is currently 
the case for high-skilled workers on the Personalised 
Employment Pass (PEP). The PEP worker can be 
sacked and not be forced to repatriate. As the MOM 
website states:
PEP holders are allowed to remain in Singapore 
for up to six months between jobs to evaluate 
new employment opportunities.45 
 
Similarly, Employment Pass and S Pass holders are 
generally granted a Short-Term Visit Pass (STVP) upon 
termination of their work passes. STVP holders can 
remain in Singapore for another 30 days to seek other 
employment opportunities.46
The potential problems with creating a PEP or STVP 
type visa for Work Permit holders are at least two fold. 
First, what would happen with the $5,000 security 
bond, now paid by employers as a guarantee that 
workers will repatriate after their visa expires?47 Would 
workers have to pay this security bond? Or would it 
be abolished? What are the implications of abolishing 
the security bond? Will it lead to more overstayers? 
Second, Work Permit holders would have to provide the 
resources and accommodation to sustain themselves 
through a period of unemployment. There is room for 
policy innovation that perhaps draws on some of the 
flexibility of other visa types, while being tailored to the 
special circumstances of Work Permit holders. 
45 “MOM Unveils New Package of Foreign Workforce Measures,” Ministry 
of Manpower, 28 November 2007, www.mom.gov.sg/newsroom/Pages/
PressReleasesDetail.aspx?listid=142 
46 Ministry of Manpower, “A Guide for Business Employer: I want to 
cancel my worker’s S Pass/Employment Pass (EP)/EntrePass” 
(4 February 2014), http://mom.gov.sg/Documents/statistics-
publications/Brochures/cancel-s-pass-ep-entrepass-english.pdf 
47 This security bond is usually paid via an insurance cover, not in cash 
by employers. 
Many questions would need to be answered. What 
length of unemployment can Work Permit holders 
sustain themselves for? What accommodation 
arrangements would be made for an unemployed 
Work Permit holder? Who would be responsible for the 
cost of the return flight?
The second route for policy development is with regards 
to ensuring worker safety in the absence of documented 
proof of abuse. What are the alternatives to waiting 
for documentary evidence of abuse? Could MOM shift 
the burden of proof from the employee (to prove his 
employer is unsafe) to the employer (to prove that the 
employee is safe from threats of repatriation and/or 
other forms of abuse and exploitation)? How would an 
employer prove that his worker is safe?
EMPLOYER DISCRETION 
OVER REPATRIATION 
COULD BE REDUCED 
BY DELINKING A WORK 
PERMIT HOLDER’S VISA 
AND EMPLOYMENT 
CONTRACT. THIS IS 
CURRENTLY THE CASE 
FOR HIGH-SKILLED 
WORKERS ON THE 
PERSONALISED 
EMPLOYMENT PASS 
(PEP).
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Agent fee debt
Overview
Our survey found that 81 per cent of the total sample 
reported having paid agent fees to come to Singapore. 
Workers reportedly paid between $1,000 and $10,000.
Our survey found that two agent fee variables correlated 
with psychological distress: ‘paid an agent fee’ and 
‘unpaid debt’. Figure 33 shows that 62 per cent of 
regular workers, and 92 per cent of injury and salary 
claim workers paid an agent fee to come to Singapore. 
Figure 34 shows that six per cent of regular workers, and 
25 per cent of injury and salary claim workers had some 
type of unpaid debt remaining at the time of our study.
The effect of paying an agent fee on psychological 
distress can be seen in Figures 35, 36, 37, and 38. 
Regular workers who paid an agent fee to come to 
Singapore had K6 scores nearly two points higher on 
average than those who did not pay an agent fee (Figure 
35).48 This translated into an increase in predicted 
prevalence of SMI of six per cent (Figure 36).49 Injury 
and salary claim workers (Figure 37) who paid an agent 
fee had K6 scores over two points higher on average than 
those who did not pay an agent fee.50 This translated into 
an increase in predicted prevalence of SMI of 23 per cent 
(Figure 38).51 Notice that in both groups, paying an agent 
fee leads to a 50 per cent increase in the chance of having 
an SMI (Figures 36 and 38).
48 An independent samples t-test found that the mean difference 
in K6 scores of 1.86 was significant with p < 0.01. 
49 A chi-squared test found that the difference in proportions of SMI 
prevalence was significant with p < 0.04.
50 An independent samples t-test found that the mean difference 
in K6 scores of 2.76 was significant with p < 0.05. 
51 A chi-squared test found that the difference in proportions of SMI 
prevalence was significant with p < 0.02.
The effect of unpaid debt (seen in Figures 39, 40, 41, 
and 42) on psychological distress was a little more 
ambiguous. Regular workers with unpaid debt had K6 
scores four points higher on average than those with 
paid debt (Figure 39).52 This translated into doubling the 
chance of having an SMI (Figure 40), but the difference 
in predicted SMI is not significant.53 Our study found no 
significant effect of unpaid debt on the psychological 
distress (K6) of injury and salary claim workers, but did 
find an effect on predicted prevalence of SMI for injury 
and salary claim workers (Figures 41 and 42).54
We noted that a recently released study of the mental 
health of FDWs in Singapore also found that debt in 
Singapore and/or home country (presumably from agent and 
other related fees) correlated with worse mental health.55 
52 An independent samples t-test found that the mean difference 
in K6 scores of 4.35 was significant with p < 0.01.
53 A chi-squared test found that the difference in proportions of SMI 
prevalence was not statistically significant (p < 0.13). 
54 An independent samples t-test found this difference was not statistically 
significant (mean difference = 1.00, p = 0.119). A chi-squared test 
found that the difference in proportions of SMI prevalence was 
significant with p < 0.04.
 
55 Humanitarian Organization for Migration Economics (HOME), 
“Home sweet home? Work, life and well-being of foreign domestic 
workers in Singapore. Research Report” (unabridged version, March, 
2015): 50.
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Figure 33:
Proportion of migrant workers 
who paid an agent fee
Figure 34:
Proportion of migrant workers
whose agent fee remains unpaid
Figure 35:
Mean K6 scores of regular 
workers (who paid an agent fee)
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Figure 36:
Proportion of regular workers
(who paid an agent fee)
predicted to have an SMI
Figure 37:
Mean K6 scores of injury and salary
claim workers (who paid
an agent fee)
Figure 38:
Proportion of injury and salary claim
workers (who paid an agent fee)
predicted to have an SMI
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Figure 39:
Mean K6 scores of regular
workers (whose debt
remains unpaid)
Figure 40:
Proportion of regular workers
(whose debt remains unpaid)
predicted to have an SMI
Figure 41:
Mean K6 scores of injury and salary 
claim workers (whose debt 
remains unpaid)
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71%
59%
Debt repaid
(n257)
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Figure 42:
Proportion of injury and salary claim
workers (whose debt remains unpaid)
predicted to have an SMI
Figure 43:
Example of stress caused by debt
How does the unpaid agent fee 
debt translate into psychological 
distress in the worker’s life? Figure 
43 provides an excerpt from 
an interview with a worker who 
describes experiences of borrowing 
to pay agent fees, and the potential 
consequences for him and his family 
should he fail to repay this debt. 
This is Kabir’s second time in Singapore working 
as a construction worker. This time round, he 
only had to pay $3,200 in agent fees compared 
to the first time, when he paid $7,000. His 
father helped him take a loan, out of which 
$1,500 has yet to be paid back. If he is unable 
to pay back the loan, he has to sell his plot of 
land, leaving his joint family of over 20 people 
homeless; he may even be sent to prison.
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Legal and policy implications
Agent fees are broadly understood to be composed of 
two parts: (1) legitimate, fairly priced, necessary services 
for the migration process, and (2) the rest, which is 
generally considered exploitative of the migrant worker.
 
There are two primary driving forces behind the 
exploitative portion of the agent fee: first, information 
and power asymmetry and, second, the layering of 
middlemen that occur within the recruitment systems in 
the migrant workers’ home countries. Information and 
power asymmetry refers to the expertise and contacts 
which a recruitment agent has, and which the potential 
migrant worker does not. Because of his or her lack of 
knowledge and access to resources like visas and jobs, 
the migrant worker is open to significant exploitation 
in the form of exorbitant fees. Layering of middlemen 
occurs within the recruitment systems in migrant 
workers’ home countries in the form of chains of referrals 
(apparently up to three people), who, like distributors in 
a pyramid scheme, take a fee for each step in the chain.
Agents and agency fees within Singapore are monitored 
by the Singapore government’s EAA regulatory 
framework. The EAA regulatory framework licences 
all entities and individuals carrying out employment 
agency work in Singapore. The framework requires that 
key appointment holders and other employment agency 
personnel must be certified via a 32 to 40 hour course, 
and that all personnel who perform employment agency-
related work must be registered. The framework requires 
a $20,000 to $60,000 security deposit to be paid by all 
employment agencies. 
With respect to agency fees, the framework caps fees 
that may be charged to employees at one month’s worth 
of salary per year of employment contract, subject to a 
maximum of two months’ worth of salary. The fee cap 
does not cover any agency fees collected and retained 
by overseas employment agencies, costs of training, 
medical check-ups overseas, and travel expenses.56 Like 
most other countries that host migrant workers (with the 
exception of New Zealand, see Figure 44), the Singapore 
government does not have a policy for regulating 
‘offshore’ agents or agency fees.
While the primary victims of exploitative agent fees 
are migrant workers, it can be argued that these agent 
fees also create a cost for Singaporean society. Agent 
fees risks being imported into Singaporean society as 
kickbacks paid to employers. These kickbacks, where 
they exist, are a form of corruption, representing 
a fee paid to an employer for the right to a job. 
Several migrant worker NGOs already claim that such 
kickbacks are entrenched within the construction 
industry, for example 57 
 
56 Ministry of Manpower, “Changes to the Employment Agency Regulatory 
 Framework”, (9 February 2011),  http://www.mom.gov.sg/~/media/
 mom/documents/foreign-manpower/employment-agencies/guide-on-
 new-ea-regulatory-framework.pdf
57 Transient Workers Count Too, “Worse off for working? Kickbacks, 
     intermediary fees and migrant construction workers in Singapore.” (12 
     August, 2012). http://twc2.org.sg/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Worse-
     off-for-working_initial-report_v2.pdf
BECAUSE OF HIS 
OR HER LACK OF 
KNOWLEDGE AND 
ACCESS TO RESOURCES 
LIKE VISAS AND JOBS, 
THE MIGRANT WORKER 
IS OPEN TO SIGNIFICANT 
EXPLOITATION IN 
THE FORM OF 
EXORBITANT FEES.
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We see three important routes for further research and 
policy development on the issue of agent fees: first, 
quantifying the distribution of debt and distress across 
the migrant worker communities of Singapore; second, 
tracing agent fees back to their sources, and calculating 
the proportion of the fees which are exploitative; and 
third, exploring options for the Singapore government to 
act to reduce the exploitative portion of agent fees paid 
by migrant workers.
 
First, one area for further research would be a rigorous 
mapping of agent fee debt and debt distress of Work 
Permit and injury and salary claim workers by country 
and industry. Agent fees and debt distress are issues 
which are most likely to be highly specific to particular 
countries and industries. This allows for the prioritisation 
of areas for further policy intervention.
Second, a combination of qualitative research methods 
could be used to trace the fees to their source. Essentially 
this would involve interviews – with workers, with 
migration agents, with employers, and possibly migrant 
government officials – with the goal of getting an exact 
breakdown of the origins of all the parts of the agent fee 
debt that migrant workers accrue. With such a breakdown, 
the legitimate migration services can be identified and 
costed, and the exploitative parts of the agent fee similarly 
identified. We acknowledge that there would be challenges 
for anyone embarking on such work, including the 
problem of cross-country research, and the difficulty of 
tracing informal networks of agents and recruiters.
Third, once such exploitative fees are identified, 
the question is “What can Singapore do about it?” 
Unfortunately, the vast bulk of the agent fees accrued 
by migrant workers are accrued in other countries. 
The migration agents who are responsible for these 
exploitative fees are beyond the reach of traditional 
Singapore law.
It seems, therefore, that some genuine policy 
innovation is going to be needed if Singapore is to be 
able to exercise some control over these agency fees. 
Researching such options is the third proposal we have 
for further research.
The type of options which we think Singapore could 
explore are, first, New Zealand’s Immigration Advisers 
Licensing Act 2007 – which regulates all of New 
Zealand’s offshore migration agents – and second, the 
model of Capella Hotels and Resorts negotiation of 
model offshore agents. As can be seen in Figure 44, 
New Zealand’s Act licences offshore (and onshore) 
agents, sets a code of conduct, and has a disciplinary 
tribunal to enforce it. As can be seen in Figure 45, 
the Singapore corporation Capella Hotels and Resorts 
managed to halve its migrant workers’ agent fees by 
working with model agencies, setting a code of conduct, 
standardising fees, and enforcing these rules through 
denial of business to those agents who did not comply. 
THE MIGRATION 
AGENTS WHO 
ARE RESPONSIBLE 
FOR THESE 
EXPLOITATIVE FEES 
ARE BEYOND THE 
REACH OF TRADITIONAL 
SINGAPORE LAW.
WE ACKNOWLEDGE 
THAT THERE WOULD 
BE CHALLENGES FOR 
ANYONE EMBARKING 
ON SUCH WORK, 
INCLUDING THE 
PROBLEM OF CROSS-
COUNTRY RESEARCH, 
AND THE DIFFICULTY 
OF TRACING INFORMAL 
NETWORKS OF AGENTS 
AND RECRUITERS.
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Figure 44:
New Zealand’s regulation
of offshore migration agents
What does the Immigration Advisers Licensing Act 2007 (the Act) do?
“The Act aims to protect consumers and enhance the reputation of New Zealand as a migration 
destination. The Act creates a framework for the regulation of individuals providing immigration 
advice both onshore and offshore.”
“The Immigration Advisers Authority (the Authority), headed by a Registrar, was established within 
the Department of Labour in 2007 to oversee the licensing of immigration advisers (www.iaa.govt.
nz). Competency standards and a code of conduct setting out the standards required of immigration 
advisers have been developed. A disciplinary tribunal (the Immigration Advisers Complaints and 
Disciplinary Tribunal) has also been established within the Ministry of Justice.”58 
Description of the Immigration Advisers Licensing Act 2007 from the New Zealand government’s 
Department of Immigration website
How does New Zealand regulate offshore migration agents?
The 2007 Act requires all persons who apply for a New Zealand visa to list, on their application form, 
any persons who have provided them with immigration advice.
Immigration advice is defined as “using, or purporting to use, knowledge of or experience in immigration 
to advise, direct, assist or represent another person in regard to an immigration matter relating to New 
Zealand, whether directly or indirectly and whether or not for gain or reward.”
According to the Act, all persons who provide immigration advice relating to New Zealand must be 
registered with the Immigration Advisers Authority (the Authority). 
Registered immigration advisers are required to abide by a code of conduct, which is approved by 
the Minister of Immigration, and listed on the Authority’s website. This code of conduct includes 
standards of professional and ethical conduct, including standards for fees, invoices, written 
agreements, and complaints procedures.59
 
The Tribunal (Immigration Advisers Complaints and Disciplinary Tribunal) and the Authority (the 
Immigration Advisers Authority) together enforce the Act and the code of conduct. Any persons may 
make a complaint to the Authority, who then investigates all complaints. The Authority may choose 
to send complaints to the Tribunal for determination. Sanctions available to the Tribunal include 
caution, training, suspension of licence, cancellation of licence, orders preventing future application 
for two years, fines, payment of costs, and refund or compensation of clients.60
continued on next page —
58 “Seeking immigration advice,” Immigration New Zealand, 9 November 2012,  
www.immigration.govt.nz/migrant/stream/advice/ 
59 “Code of Conduct – Professional Practice,” Immigration Advisers Authority, ,n.d., www.iaa.govt.nz/code/professional-practice.
asp#pp18 
60 “Complaints and Offences,” Immigration Advisers Authority, n.d., www.iaa.govt.nz/adviser/complaints/enforcement/complaints-
offences.asp
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Figure 44:
New Zealand’s regulation
of offshore migration agents
Figure 45:
Capella Hotel and Resorts’
negotiation of model offshore agents
— continued from previous page
How does the New Zealand system differ from Singapore’s EAA?
The most notable distinction between the New Zealand system and Singapore’s EAA is that the 
New Zealand regulations apply to both onshore and offshore migration agents. This is in significant 
contrast to Singapore laws which, for example, require licence holders to be Singapore Citizens, 
Permanent Residents, or Employment Pass holders.61 The scope of the two regulatory frameworks 
also appear to be quite different, with, for example, the New Zealand Act regulating all fees charged 
by migration agents, while Singapore’s legislation explicitly excludes agency fees retained by overseas 
employment agents, expenses incurred overseas (such as training and medical check-ups overseas), 
and travel expenses to Singapore.62
61 “Licensing Requirements”, Ministry of Manpower, 22 December 2014, www.mom.gov.sg/foreign-manpower/employment-
agencies/legislation-licensing-criteria/Pages/default.aspx
62 Ministry of Manpower, “Changes to Employment Agency Regulatory Framework” (2010), Slide 29, 
www.mom.gov.sg/Documents/foreign- manpower/Employment%20Agencies/Briefings
%20to%20EAs%20Presentation%20Slides.pdf 
In 2008, the Singapore company Capella Hotels and Resorts (then known as West Paces Hotel Group) 
commissioned a report which studied the recruitment practices and integration of migrant workers into 
the 4-star and 5-star hospitality sector. 
The recommendations of the report were implemented with an international recruitment strategy 
for Work Permit holders, which aimed at removing exploitative fees and practices to better motivate 
employees to deliver quality work with full attention and commitment. Prior to the implementation of 
the programme, 82 per cent of employees were paying $6,500 or more in agent fees, and 47 per cent 
were paying $8,000 or more. The programme claimed to have approximately halved the agent fees for 
its employees in the first cohort. 
Capella’s strategy for halving agent fees involved signing agreements with model agents with a detailed 
code of conduct, including standardised agent fees. Agents who broke these agreements were denied 
further business until their practices reached an acceptable standard.
 
A Capella spokesperson said: “We endeavour to do our best to improve the lives of all team members 
whether Singaporean or foreign, and treat all staff fairly. We have terminated agreements with third 
parties who have not respected our commitments. We are not perfect but we continue to be vigilant to 
ensure that we always do the right thing by our people.”
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Conclusion
Low-paid migrant workers are a vital yet vulnerable part of 
Singapore’s economy and society. Numbering nearly one 
million persons, it is crucial that we seek to understand 
the welfare issues of this segment of the population.
We undertook two forms of analysis. First, we measured 
the levels of psychological distress and expected SMI 
amongst 261 South Asian Work Permit holders, and 
344 South Asian injury and salary claim workers. While 
most regular Work Permit holders were relatively happy 
and healthy, our study predicts endemic levels of SMI 
amongst the injury and salary claim workers: 62 per cent 
met the screening conditions for an SMI. We found three 
main drivers of psychological distress: housing problems 
of injury and salary claim workers, threats of repatriation, 
and agent fee debt.
Second, we used qualitative interviews and secondary 
research to attempt to understand the fundamental 
dynamics of these drivers of distress, and to recommend 
strategic areas for further research. We found that the 
housing problems of injury and salary claim workers 
seemed to be intimately connected to this issue of 
threats of repatriation. Most workers we spoke to had 
left employer accommodation “voluntarily”, out of fear 
for their safety and welfare. The case of agent fee debt, 
we argued, is largely a product of two main factors 
in the recruitment process in these workers’ home 
countries: information and power asymmetry between the 
recruitment agents and potential workers, and the layering 
of middlemen, with the consequent layering of fees. 
We propose a number of areas where further research 
could help understand and alleviate the sources of 
stress identified in this paper. To address the problem 
of distress caused by lack of accommodation, we 
recommend exploring options for alternative housing for 
injury and salary claim workers. To address the problem 
of distress caused by threats of repatriation, we suggest 
exploring options for delinking Work Permit holders’ visas 
and employment contracts. For example, one option 
is to change Work Permit visas so that they are more 
like PEP or STVP, which an employer cannot cancel. 
Another option is to review the burden of proof required 
by workers to qualify for such assistance when abuse is 
alleged. To address the problem of distress caused by 
agent fee debt, we recommend exploring the regulation 
of offshore migration agents using a system similar to 
that used by New Zealand, or by the Singapore firm 
Capella Hotels and Resorts.
As we wrote in the beginning, confronting and solving 
these issues is not just about improving the welfare of 
migrant workers in Singapore. There are also economic 
and political interests of Singapore that are affected by 
these issues. Some of our findings have implications 
for Singapore’s occupational health and safety system. 
Other findings have implications for the agent fee 
system,  which could represent a mechanism by which 
unsavoury practices like kickbacks are imported into the 
Singaporean society. Finally, all of our findings suggest 
there is room for improvement in the general organisation 
of the laws and procedures governing migrant workers in 
Singapore. We hope that this study will help contribute 
to such change.
 

Vital yet vulnerable
53
About the 
publication
About the Lien Centre 
for Social Innovation
Numbering nearly one million persons, low-waged, low-skilled 
migrant workers are a vital yet vulnerable part of Singapore’s 
economy and society. This study, undertaken several months before 
the Little India riots of December 2013, measures the psychological 
distress of 261 South Asian Work Permit holders, and 344 South 
Asian injury and salary claim workers. While most regular Work 
Permit holders are relatively happy and healthy, our study finds that 
62 per cent of injury and salary claim workers meet the screening 
conditions for a Serious Mental Illness. We find that the three main 
drivers of psychological distress are (1) the housing problems of 
injury and salary claim workers, (2) threats of repatriation against 
both injured and regular workers, and (3) agent fee debt. We 
recommend a range of policy options to address these problems, 
including alternative housing for injury and salary claim workers; 
delinking Work Permit holders’ visas and employment contracts; 
and regulation of offshore migration agents.
The Lien Centre for Social Innovation, a partnership between 
the Lien Foundation and Singapore Management University, was 
established in 2006 to advance the thinking and capability of the 
social sector. The Lien Centre contributes to a more equitable, 
inclusive and vibrant society by addressing social needs through 
innovative approaches. We drive socially innovative solutions by 
strengthening social sector organisations so that they become 
influential and effective partners with business and government. We 
also work at the intersection of the public, private and social sectors 
to catalyse social innovation.
The Lien Centre’s Social Insight Research Series is a series of 
research papers which explores topics of contemporary interest in 
Singapore and the region, generating new thinking and fostering 
innovative practices.
All Lien Centre research is available for download from the Lien 
Centre website, at www.lcsi.smu.edu.sg
www.lcsi.smu.edu.sg
